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American Overreach: Strategic Interests and
Millennial Ambitions in the Middle East
ASLI BÂLI
Law School, University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA), CA, USA
AZIZ RANA
Law School, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA
This article argues that American actions in the Middle East
designed to advance democracy and/or ‘moderation’ tend to yield
perverse outcomes that frustrate the aspirations of local actors while
undermining the values purportedly being promoted by the US.
In order to explain these contradictions, we emphasise the link-
age between policies of democracy promotion and long-standing
American commitments both to millennialism and geographi-
cal omnipresence. As a result of these policies and geopolitical
vision, we argue that ‘democracy promotion’ often devolves into
a simple defence of American interest – by producing electoral
outcomes intended to strengthen local agents seen as compliant
with US regional priorities. In this context, the shift from democ-
racy promotion to a policy of pursuing ‘moderation’ in the region,
understood as support for American policies, is entirely coher-
ent. Commentators tend to present this shift (particularly in the
wake of the Iraq War) as recognition by US political actors of the
imperial overtones embedded in more heavy-handed approaches
to regime change. Yet, the call for moderation is itself profoundly
intertwined with American millennial aspirations, while remain-
ing remarkably devoid of clear content and thus equally amenable
to manipulation for strategic ends. By way of conclusion, we sug-
gest an alternative basis for a less intrusive American position in
the region, one that rejects the need for an overstretched territorial
presence and that is grounded in a substantive respect for local
self-determination.
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At the heart of American foreign policy in the Middle East is a persistent
contradiction. On the surface, the US enjoys greater military and economic
dominance over the region than perhaps ever before. Even prior to the occu-
pations of both Iraq and Afghanistan, the US stationed nearly 30,000 troops
across the Middle East, including at least one hundred active-duty person-
nel in Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the
United Arab Emirates.1 This extensive military footprint has brought with it
clear economic effects, in particular providing the country with an unprece-
dented degree of direct access to oil resources inside Iraq and elsewhere. To
further underscore American primacy, the US’s sole regional competitor is
Iran, a relatively weak local player whose economic and military capacities
hardly compare to previous imperial or Cold War rivals.
Still, despite this position of unquestioned dominance, the US is
nonetheless deeply limited in its ability to project strategic power in the
long term. Actual American policies have been a continual source of dis-
order throughout the Middle East. Along with pursuing or promoting four
separate regional wars (two interventions in Iraq, one in Afghanistan, and
the July War between Lebanon and Israel), American actions have played
critical roles in sustaining tensions in the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict
and in producing wild fluctuations in the oil markets. On the one hand,
such instability has clearly entrenched a permanent logic of American inter-
vention, which aids the US’s ability to impose its preferences on the region.
Yet, on the other hand, as disorder has increased, the US in recent years has
found itself over-stretched, with regional commitments that exceed both its
military and economic capacities to project power. Not only does this fact
raise doubts about the continued viability of US policies, it also threatens
the maintenance of American regional authority.
Such long-term strategic weakness is underscored by American reliance
on allies and proxies who face extensive local opposition. The primary
source of this opposition derives from the authoritarianism of many of the
regimes most directly aligned with the United States. Since the end of the
Cold War, association with American policies in the region has only exac-
erbated such underlying domestic illegitimacy. Further, US foreign policy
has become a focus of local resentments, with popular calls for reform
explicitly opposing continued American influence. With political channels
foreclosed to opponents of the region’s autocrats, resort to extra-political
violence has occurred with increasing frequency within the Middle East and
beyond. Unable to establish a coherent and stable regional consensus, the
US finds itself stoking anti-American sentiment and undermining the credibil-
ity of its own allies. For students of American foreign policy this fact may be
particularly ironic at a moment when the US has made democracy-promotion
a centrepiece of its policies.
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In this context of short-term dominance and long-term strategic weak-
ness, the puzzle remains of why the US is pursuing its goals in ways that
undermine its interest in regional stability. This article argues that America’s
current role can be best explained by exploring the long-standing millen-
nial justifications for US foreign policy. As we discuss in the following
pages, such millennial arguments assert that protecting American freedom
at home requires the complete pacification of external violence abroad as
well as the continual global extension of the US’s territorial presence. In the
American experience, these anxieties have deep roots, extending back to the
earliest period of Anglo colonisation, and at present depict the US as con-
fronting a world of inchoate threats.2 In interrogating the current iteration
of American millennialism in the Middle East, this article analyses how US
policies centred on the discourses of democracy and moderation – although
employed to contain violence and impose regional order – produce internal
contradictions that are ultimately self-defeating.
US FOREIGN POLICY AND THE QUEST FOR PERMANENT PEACE
The problem of the United States’ strategic weakness in the Middle East has
not gone unnoticed by policy makers and students of the region.3 If any-
thing, it has generated a number of potential explanations. One approach
focuses on how domestic constraints on American foreign policy produce
bureaucratic incoherence and sub-optimal outcomes. John Mearsheimer and
Stephen Walt offer perhaps the most well-known and controversial version
of this argument, emphasising the power of pro-Israel groups to shape
Middle East policy and discourse.4 Other versions emphasise competition
between elements of the foreign policy bureaucracy, such as infighting
between the State and Defense Departments.5 Following the election of
Democratic candidate Barack Obama as president, an increasingly com-
mon explanation has been to present current difficulties in the region as
the legacy of the Bush administration, with the last eight years viewed as
an aberration rather than the product of deeper institutional or ideational
problems.
Yet, America’s position in the Middle East – of paradoxical strength
and weakness – cannot be explained by the rise of ‘neo-conservatism’ or
bureaucratic incoherence alone. While relevant to specific policy outcomes,
such arguments fail to appreciate the remarkable historical continuities
between Democratic and Republican administrations, continuities that tie
Obama’s presidency to its predecessor. In essence, they ignore the struc-
tural context within which policy debates take place. Such explanations
also ignore how the permanent logic of American intervention pre-dates
the rise of either a strong pro-Israel lobby or today’s particular modes of
bureaucratic fragmentation and competition. In fact, this permanent logic
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is in large part due to long-term developments in American political iden-
tity. Drawing on approaches in critical geopolitics6 helps explain how an
American commitment to spatial omnipresence – particularly through a
continually growing network of military outposts – has become central to
national self-understanding and to presumptions about its global purpose.
The US not only maintains a decisive defence commitment in the Middle
East, it is physically present throughout the world to a degree that is histori-
cally unparalleled. As of 2009, some 516,273 military service members – not
including Department of Defense civilian officials – were deployed abroad,
stationed across 716 reported overseas bases and present in approximately
150 foreign states (nearly 80 percent of the world’s countries).7 This world-
wide military network is sustained by tremendous expenditures, which
account for almost half of global defence spending – a number equal to
the following twenty nations combined.8 Yet, as John Agnew notes, the
US is hardly a traditional empire, one that would seek direct colonies or
permanent political sovereignty.9 Instead, such omnipresence promotes an
American project of hegemony, in which the US enrolls “others in the exer-
cise of [its own] power by convincing, cajoling, and coercing”10 external
players to take part in extending US economic and military influence.
Similar to previous hegemons (or imperial states such as France and
Britain), the projection of American power is defended not only in terms of
strategic interest, but also through an intricate set of ideological justifications.
These justifications present US omnipresence as a force of global well-being
and moral authority. The key ideological grounding for such geographic
reach and assertiveness lies in the idea of the US as a chosen community,
enjoying an historically redemptive mission.11 The earliest Puritan settlers
saw themselves as sent by God on ‘an errand into the wilderness,’ to serve
as a model of Christian piety and to help precipitate the coming of heaven
on earth. John Winthrop famously declared, “We shall be as a City upon a
Hill, the eyes of all people are upon us.”12 At the heart of this idea of a ‘city
upon a hill’ was a commitment to millennialism – the belief that God would
one day rule on earth and create a permanent condition of peace. While
dramatically altered from colonial and nineteenth-century iterations, today
millennialism continues to play a surprisingly central role in American polit-
ical identity, although largely secularised and stripped of its overt Protestant
implications. In particular, the commitment to permanent peace sits at the
heart of America’s force projection in the world.
Since the US’s emergence as a global power at the beginning of the
twentieth century, the goal of pacification has been connected to the persis-
tent idea that Americans would only be safe at home if the world could be
reconstructed as a community of stable democracies. In the wake of World
War II, no text better expressed this linkage between peace and democracy
promotion than National Security Document number sixty-eight. Generally
considered the foundational text of Cold War foreign policy, NSC-68, written
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in 1950, did not simply emphasise the specific security dilemmas posed by
the Soviet Union. It also reaffirmed the vision of the US as enjoying a unique
historical project, one that aimed to protect national freedom by eliminating
all potential sites of foreign chaos:
In a shrinking world, which now faces the threat of atomic warfare, it is
not an adequate objective merely to seek to check the Kremlin design, for
the absence of order among nations is becoming less and less tolerable.
This fact imposes on us, in our own interests, the responsibility of world
leadership. It demands that we make the attempt, and accept the risks
inherent in it, to bring about order and justice by means consistent with
the principles of freedom and democracy.13
In essence, NSC-68 presented the implications of the American mission-
ary project for the Cold War, and asserted that overcoming the threat
posed by international disorder required both US global supremacy and
the reconstitution of foreign regimes in the name of democracy.
It also underscored the US’s commitment to its own geographical
omnipresence. In essence, wherever threats loomed, no matter how distant
from America’s actual territorial boundaries, the US had a responsibility to
transform disorder into democratic peace. Since World War II, the unabated
growth of the US’s spatial and military footprint illustrates the continued
centrality of these themes. Even more importantly, it also demonstrates how
millennial identity and territorial unboundedness have become mutually
reinforcing. Precisely because of the need to overcome international dis-
order no matter where it exists, the US has extended its geographic reach.
Yet, in doing so, America also finds itself subject to local insurrections and
new potential dangers, which in turn justify even greater territorial presence.
At present, national identity and ideas of domestic security are pro-
foundly connected to an American vision of itself as the world’s primary
international force for stability and democratic transformation.14 Over the last
hundred years, these millennial ambitions have been most associated with
the Democratic Party, as exemplified by Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points,
as well as the human rights rhetoric of policies pursued by Franklin Delano
Roosevelt, Jimmy Carter, and Bill Clinton. By contrast, Republicans, at least
going back to the Party’s opposition to Wilson’s League of Nations, have long
been associated both with greater tendencies toward isolationism as well as
realpolitik international perspectives. But more recently, central figures in
the Republican foreign policy establishment have embraced a Wilsonian
brand of millennialism styled as neo-conservative.15 With this turn, both the
right and left are increasingly articulating claims about US strategic objec-
tives in the language of moral right and which take as given the need for
territorial reach.
Such claims are evident in both George Bush’s 2003 State of the Union
Address and Barack Obama’s March 2009 policy speech on his new strategy
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for Afghanistan and Pakistan. In laying the foundation for an impending
invasion of Iraq, and in highlighting the US’s historic role as the paramount
global force for order and tranquility, Bush asserted,
Once again, this nation and all our friends are all that stand between a
world at peace, and a world of chaos and constant alarm. Once again,
we are called to defend the safety of our people and the hopes of all
mankind. And we accept this responsibility. . . . The liberty we prize is
not America’s gift to the world, it is God’s gift to humanity.16
The address captured all of the key elements of the American sense of
moral purpose, underscoring the degree to which US omnipresence not
only protected domestic security but also made possible the international
hope of democratic peace.
While employing less florid language, Obama has more recently reiter-
ated both the US project of pacification and its tie to the nation’s historically
redemptive mission. To date, Obama’s primary regional effort has been in
re-directing American military and diplomatic focus back to the conflict in
Afghanistan. Speaking of the urgency of America’s mission, President Obama
stressed that to fail to stabilise the area would lead to the return of the
extremist, “core Taliban leadership” and would “cast Afghanistan under the
shadow of perpetual violence.”17 Obama’s speech – with its emphasis on
the starkly contrasted alternatives of peace and security on the one hand,
and chaos and violence on the other – are reminiscent not only of President
Bush’s language of moral obligation, but echo the tradition of American
millennialism from which both presidents draw inspiration:
We are in Afghanistan to confront a common enemy that threatens the
United States, our friends and allies, and the people of Afghanistan and
Pakistan. . . . That is a cause that could not be more just. . . . The world
cannot afford the price that will come due if Afghanistan slides back
into chaos. . . . We have a shared responsibility to act – not because
we seek to project power for its own sake, but because our own peace
and security depends upon it. And what’s at stake now is not just our
own security – it is the very idea that free nations can come together on
behalf of our common security. . . . Because the United States of America
stands for peace and security, justice and opportunity. That is who we
are, and that is what history calls on us to do once more.18
While eliminating the overtly religious tone of President Bush’s rhetorical
flourishes, Obama too starkly presents a conception of America’s role in
Afghanistan and Pakistan as redemptive, the only means for securing a
peaceful future for “free nations” and staving off the chaos of extremism.
For Obama, as for Bush, wherever these threats emerge, the US has an
historical duty to transform disorder into democratic calm.
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To the extent that there has been a break between administrations,
a central disagreement concerns whether these ends should be pursued
unilaterally or multilaterally through coalition-building and international
institutions. Anne-Marie Slaughter, the current Director of Policy Planning
at the Department of State, argues that the problem with the Bush admin-
istration was that its unilateralism – especially with regard to Iraq – gave
Wilsonianism a black eye: “Iraq has given armed intervention in a country’s
internal affairs a very bad name . . . . However, the right lesson to draw
is . . . . to turn back to Wilson’s original ideas and recognize the extent to
which updated versions of them have become woven through the warp and
woof of the international system.”19 In other words, the US should maintain
its commitments to global assertiveness and permanent peace, but in the
context of greater international support. Reaffirming the millennial project of
democratic tranquility, she concludes, “We must find ways to work together
to achieve Wilson’s vision: a world made safe for democracy, prosperity,
knowledge, beauty and human flourishing.”20
In essence, this new Obama administration approach does not repudi-
ate the logic of permanent intervention, since multilateralism is ultimately
only a strategic tool for promoting given ends. Even if policies aimed
at securing pacification and democratisation are pursued through greater
international agreement, they still underscore bipartisan commitment to
fundamentally millennial goals. This underlying continuity has two clear
dimensions. First, regardless of the change in Administration the basic ideo-
logical focus on pacification has remained constant. Even in Obama’s speech
on receiving the Nobel Peace Prize, he used the occasion as an opportunity
to reinforce the inevitability of extremist threat and the necessity of American
power for global security, stating:
For make no mistake: evil does exist in the world. A non-violent move-
ment could not have halted Hitler’s armies. Negotiations cannot convince
al Qaeda’s leaders to lay down their arms . . . . [T]he plain fact is this: the
United States of America has helped underwrite global security for more
than six decades with the blood of our citizens and the strength of our
arms . . . We have borne this burden not because we seek to impose our
will. We have done so out of enlightened self-interest.21
At the same time, this ideological focus has clear structural corollaries,
embodied by the economic and military infrastructure necessary for the
maintenance and projection of American authority. While both dimensions,
ideological and structural, operate in tandem, the infrastructural invest-
ment required to project current force levels indefinitely into the future
generates its own related objectives and self-perpetuating logic. Although
differences clearly exist among policy actors and Administrations, a primary
focus on these differences masks profound consensus on matters of basic
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political identity and institutional interests. Thus, while U.S. foreign pol-
icy with respect to the Middle East has a variety of intellectual roots and
contemporary forms, nowhere is this underlying consensus more evident.
Since September 11, the central American emphasis vis-á-vis the region
has been on transforming Arab and Muslim societies politically and ethi-
cally. This emphasis – present in both Republican and Democratic foreign
policy establishments – reflects in part the view that the source of violence
emanating from the Middle East is rooted within these societies. Such a
diagnosis identifies the lack of democracy, poor economic performance,
and local political and religious culture as requiring basic reform. Since
Arab states are considered incapable of developing this reform internally,
only external influence is viewed to be a viable remedy for local patholo-
gies. By discounting the degree to which external interference has itself
been a critical cause of regional problems, this perspective ignores American
involvement in perpetuating the region’s underlying instability. As a result,
U.S. efforts at regional transformation have fallen into the same trap that has
long plagued American millennial ambitions. As with past interventionist
projects, policymakers imagine that they can combine moral objectives with
goals of American dominance. However, in attempting to do so, the former
are repeatedly subordinated, with principles of democracy and liberalism
reduced to short-term security imperatives of U.S. power.
In fact, across both Bush and Obama administrations, this persistent
commitment to pacifying global threats has deeply undermined the sub-
stantive meaning of democracy promotion. Rather than an embrace of
self-determination which respects local demands, democracy promotion has
become fixated on providing legitimacy to compliant elites. Moreover, when
elections fail to produce the desired outcome, US policy makers generally
claim that local groups are ideologically ill-prepared for democratic pro-
cesses and seek to undercut these governments. The eventual result has
been a corroding effect on both the credibility and legitimacy of American
behaviour in the region. Liberal and conservative brands of Wilsonianism
have generated a cycle of disillusionment with American influence, as local
actors first embrace the moral justifications of US foreign policy and then
grow frustrated and resentful as the US fails to act in ways consistent with
these justifications.
FROM DEMOCRACY PROMOTION TO DEMOCRACY DEMOTION
IN THE MIDDLE EAST
The previous section provided a historical and theoretical account of
American Wilsonianism. This section explores the interventionist conse-
quences for the Middle East of such a geopolitical vision. We provide
an empirically grounded assessment of the often paradoxical impact of
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America’s professed interest in regional democratisation. We do so by com-
paring two key examples of American democracy promotion from 2005
to the present: US activities in the Palestinian Authority and in Lebanon.
As illustrated below, elections in each setting have been among the most
dynamic and open in the region. Yet, for the US, these elections have come
to be judged by their ability to keep American allies in power and have been
subject to destabilising forms of interference.
The year 2005 brought a wave of elections across the region, impacted
by developments in American policy in Iraq as well as by the grand strategy
for democratisation announced by President Bush in his second inaugu-
ral address. To appreciate the connection envisaged by American policy
makers between national security and millennial commitments to expanding
freedom, it is worthwhile to revisit Bush’s sweeping remarks:
For as long as whole regions of the world simmer in resentment and
tyranny – prone to ideologies that feed hatred and excuse murder –
violence will gather, and multiply in destructive power, and cross the
most defended borders, and raise a mortal threat. . . . The survival of
liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other
lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom
in all the world. America’s vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now
one. . . . So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the
growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and
culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world. . . . The
leaders of governments with long habits of control need to know: To
serve your people you must learn to trust them.22
According to Bush, democracy promotion was essential to eliminat-
ing sites of international disorder and thus to ensuring that chaos would
not threaten American security or the global pursuit of peace. Moreover,
the president’s 2005 speech, a clarion call for democratisation, was aimed
squarely at regimes in the Middle East. His address to “leaders of govern-
ments with long habits of control” seemed tailored to American allies in the
Arab world and was interpreted as such. Following his speech, as previously
scheduled elections across the Arab world took place, beginning with the
Iraqi elections, a direct connection was drawn between the new American
emphasis on democracy promotion and developments in the Middle East.
Fouad Ajami, a political analyst of the Middle East and advisor to the Bush
administration declared, “We have George W. Bush to thank for the Arab
democratic spring,”23 while an article in Newsweek applauded Secretary of
State, Condoleezza Rice, for “rush[ing] onto the world stage with force and
style, and with the fair wind of the Arab Democratic Spring at her back.”24
One of the places that saw the greatest pressure to hold elections under
the rubric of democratisation was the West Bank and Gaza. Despite the irony
of the American demand that Palestinians demonstrate an ability to sustain
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a viable democracy before being accorded a state, Palestinians exceeded
expectations in January 2006. Palestinian civil society once again proved to
be the liveliest and most politically active in the Arab world, convening
elections that were exemplary in the region. In free, fair, and interna-
tionally monitored elections, Hamas captured a majority of the Palestinian
Legislative Council. However, as we explore, with the defeat of its local
proxies, American support for elections came to an abrupt end for all but
rhetorical purposes – not only in Palestine but in the entire region.
Tellingly, Hamas’s electoral performance represented the first instance
of peaceful alternation of power in the Arab world.25 Moreover, it was the
product of a strategy by the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority (PA) to bring
Hamas into the political system to bolster the credibility of the PA. This
strategy of incorporating Hamas was also intended to make the group an
institutional stakeholder and thus less likely to act as a spoiler for Fatah’s
initiatives. Despite its staunch opposition to Hamas, the United States, too,
bought into this logic in advance of the elections. According to at least one
account, the US was particularly taken by the idea that a Fatah victory in an
election with Hamas participation would weaken political Islam in Palestine
and the region as a whole.26
Neither Fatah nor Hamas expected the group to win a majority in
the elections. As such, both the conduct of the elections in Palestine and
their unexpected result should have been seen as an important milestone in
democratisation efforts in the region, rather than their epitaph. To the extent
that the international emphasis on local elections was intended to address
the PA’s record of cronyism and poor governance, Hamas’s platform, with its
domestic focus on competence, credibility, and anti-corruption was consis-
tent with the goals of election advocates. Unlike Fatah, Hamas also proved
to have both the organisational skills to conduct a successful campaign27 and
the support of a “broad-based social movement connected to multiple insti-
tutions in the West Bank and Gaza.”28 Moreover, analysts across the board
noted that Hamas’s victory was not a referendum on relations with Israel but
on the corruption of domestic incumbents. Unfortunately, precisely because
of this context, the international community, and specifically the US, inter-
fered throughout the process to prejudice the election. The International
Crisis Group (ICG) documented instances of intervention to alter the tim-
ing of the elections and to shift resources in ways designed to strengthen
the US’s preferred party, Fatah.29 Despite these efforts, or perhaps partly as
a result of Palestinian perceptions of Fatah as an American proxy, Hamas
prevailed.
Following the election, the US convinced the Quartet to initiate an
international financial blockade of the Palestinian Authority.30 The block-
ade advanced the political goal of impoverishing Palestinians into reversing
their democratic choice. In an effort to stem the Palestinian crisis by break-
ing the strategic impasse between Fatah and Hamas, the Saudis convened
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the Fatah-affiliated Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, and Hamas lead-
ers to conclude a deal for a national unity government. The result – the
Mecca Agreement – was a fragile entente designed to create a Fatah-Hamas
power-sharing arrangement. This arrangement would end factional fighting
and present a more acceptable Palestinian leadership to the international
community.
The deal came into effect in February 2007, but was short-lived due in
no small measure to American opposition. The US engaged in a sustained
effort to realign Abbas’ incentives, requiring the Fatah faction to choose
either power-sharing with Hamas or assistance from the international com-
munity. During the limited tenure of the national unity government, the
Americans engaged selectively with non-Hamas members of the govern-
ment through back channels while maintaining the economic embargo. More
damagingly, the US provided direct security assistance and funding to Fatah
contingents and security forces, such as the Presidential Guard, in a clear bid
to strengthen one political faction in Palestine at the expense of the other. In
the words of the ICG analysis, “Through their words and deeds, [American
policy makers] helped persuade important Fatah elements that the unity
government was a transient phenomenon and that their former control of
the Palestinian Authority could be restored.”31 Little consideration was given
by either the US or their Fatah counterparts to the fact that such a restora-
tion of power would be in direct conflict with the results of internationally
monitored elections – ones they themselves convened just a year before.
By June 2007, the Mecca Agreement gave way to renewed clashes that
degenerated into a struggle for control of the Gaza Strip. Although the events
that eventually led to Hamas’ gaining sole control of Gaza have been char-
acterised in the Western press as a violent coup on the part of Hamas, the
facts tell a more complicated story. While it is true that the Hamas mili-
tia seized control of government institutions in the Gaza Strip by force, in
light of their overwhelming electoral victory the characterisation of Hamas’
control in Gaza as a ‘coup’ begs the question: against whom? Hamas had
already secured a clear parliamentary majority through elections, which gave
it a mandate to govern without resorting to violence. The problem, as told
by Hamas supporters, was the unwillingness of Fatah and its foreign allies
to respect the outcome of the elections and permit Hamas to exercise this
mandate. More to the point, Hamas argued that Fatah, particularly through
the militias affiliated with Mohammed Dahlan in Gaza, threatened a violent
overthrow.32
The aftermath of four days of all-out war between militias in the streets
of Gaza left Hamas in complete control there, but enabled Fatah to con-
solidate its power in the West Bank. The key features of this consolidation
were the dissolution by President Mahmoud Abbas of the parliament elected
in 2006 and its replacement by an appointed government without elec-
toral approval. As ICG observed, Abbas became increasingly authoritarian,
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governing by “presidential decrees appropriating legislative powers or trans-
ferring them to the PLO, [in violation of] Palestinian law.”33 Further, the newly
installed government amended electoral rules to effectively exclude Hamas
candidates from the next legislative elections, facilitating the return to one-
party rule in the Palestinian territories.34 The international response to these
events, led by the US, has been to reward the Fatah government in the West
Bank. On the one hand, the international community has eased the financial
embargo in the West Bank and recognised President Abbas as the sole legit-
imate representative of the Palestinians in the reinitiated ‘peace process.’ On
the other hand, the total embargo on Gaza has been maintained and even
intensified. By the end of 2008, the situation in the Gaza Strip amounted
to an artificial, man-made humanitarian crisis of staggering proportions. The
fruit of Palestinians’ democratic choice has been the impoverishment of the
population still governed by the electoral victor.35
Even in the wake of a devastating war in Gaza, which only worsened
the humanitarian consequences of the embargo, the Obama administration
has pursued the same basic approach of selectively funding proxies regard-
less of electoral legitimacy. In March 2009, Hillary Clinton’s first major action
as Secretary of State regarding Palestinian politics was to offer $1 billion
in aid to Fatah, a move widely seen as an effort to maintain Bush-era
policies, with the ultimate purpose of undermining the strength and gov-
erning capacity of Hamas in Gaza.36 The US also continues to invest heavily
in arming Fatah through the Palestinian Authority’s security organs. In 2007,
the Bush administration sent Lieutenant General Keith Dayton to train and
equip Fatah against its internal adversary, a fact Dayton himself acknowl-
edged as his primary role.37 Not only has the new White House team kept
Dayton in the West Bank, his position has become so entrenched that it is
common in the territories to refer to the Fatah-controlled PA security forces
as the ‘Dayton forces’ and to the PA itself as the ‘Dayton government.’ Just
as troublingly, the Obama administration appears in no hurry to call for
new elections, despite the fact that Abbas’s presidential term expired in
January 2009 and the current West Bank Prime Minister, Salam Fayyad, has
no electoral mandate and was simply appointed by Abbas in 2007.38
Rather than a Bush-era aberration, the Obama administration persists
in reinforcing this classic stance of effusive democratic rhetoric combined
with support on the ground, often through coercion, for compliant elites.
Alongside practices in the PA, another clear example has been the pursuit
of virtually identical policies in Lebanon, with American influence employed
to pit internal factions against each other despite the country’s long history
of civil war and sectarian conflict. In his 2009 Middle East policy speech in
Cairo, Obama went out of his way to repudiate the notion that the US had
any interest in intervening in local elections and thus paid respect to the
importance of local control for authentic democratisation. Obama declared,
“America does not presume to know what is best for everyone, just as we
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would not presume to pick the outcome of a peaceful election. . . . Those
are not just American ideas, they are human rights, and that is why we
will support them everywhere.”39 Yet, less than two weeks before Obama’s
Cairo speech, Vice President Joseph Biden made a dramatic appearance
in Lebanon on the eve of the country’s parliamentary elections. With the
exception of a brief meeting with Nabih Berri, the Speaker of the House
nominally allied with the opposition March 8th camp, he met in private
and exclusively with figures associated with Prime Minister Fouad Siniora
and the Sunni “Future” movement. In fact, his clear and public preference
for one of the two competing coalitions in the impending Lebanese elec-
tions demonstrated the substantial continuity between the Obama and Bush
administration approaches to internal Lebanese politics.
After the ill-fated Israeli attempt during the July 2006 war to eliminate or
substantially weaken Hezbollah as a political actor on the Lebanese scene,
the Bush administration began an aggressive policy of bolstering Hezbollah’s
domestic opponents. While ostensibly offering aid to the Lebanese Armed
Forces (LAF) and Internal Security Forces (ISF) to strengthen Lebanese state
institutions, the Bush administration made clear that this meant building
the capacity of particular Lebanese factions to counter-balance Hezbollah.40
Indeed, the US ambassador to Lebanon, Michele Sison – originally appointed
by President Bush but still in her position under the Obama administration –
testified that “Lebanon is at the forefront of US efforts to promote democ-
racy . . . and combat extremism in the Middle East,” and that the US is
therefore training and equipping the LAF and ISF “to support their deploy-
ment throughout Lebanon to provide security” against “Hizballah and other
illegal armed groups [that] continue to threaten the peace and security of the
Lebanese people.”41 After President Obama took office, Ambassador Sison
continued to underscore that American support to the LAF and ISF was
intended primarily for internal security and counter-terrorism purposes, and
that all military assistance was provided on the condition that arms be used
in way consistent with “U.S. national security imperatives.”42 In the words of
the BBC: “The US has given the Lebanese army more than $410 million . . .
in order to provide a counterweight to Hezbollah’s powerful military wing,
the Islamic Resistance.”43
In keeping with the US policy of bolstering Lebanese internal security
forces to contain Hezbollah, the government of Prime Minister Siniora was
encouraged by the Bush administration to adopt a hard line in 2008 negoti-
ations with the opposition bloc, denying them the share of cabinet seats to
which they were entitled based on their electoral performance. The negotia-
tions, which were designed to break an 18-month political impasse that had
paralysed Lebanon’s parliament, broke down and led to fighting between
militias in the streets of West Beirut in May 2008.44 While the US-trained
and supported LAF and ISF stayed out of the street battles, the fighting
did see the emergence of a new militia, affiliated with the US-supported
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Hariri camp’s Future movement. The new Sunni militia was defeated by
Hezbollah forces, which then voluntarily turned captured portions of West
Beirut over to the control of the LAF. The creation, arming, and financing
of private security forces to develop a Future movement militia was the
logical consequence of the Bush administration’s ‘counter-balancing’ strat-
egy for Lebanon.45 Only when the armed strategy failed were the Siniora
government and the Hariri camp left with no choice but to return to nego-
tiations – despite Bush administration objections – and to accept a national
unity accord with the opposition, including Hezbollah. Less than a year after
the formation of this national unity government, as new Lebanese elections
approached, the Obama administration picked up where the Bush admin-
istration had left off, once again inserting its preferences into the Lebanese
political arena.
During his high-profile visit, Vice President Biden took the stage in
Beirut and declared that while “the shape and composition of Lebanon’s
government is for the Lebanese people to decide,. . . I urge those who
would think about standing with the spoilers of peace not to miss this
opportunity to walk away from the spoilers.”46 To make the threat even
less veiled, Biden asserted that “I know, for the United States at least, we
will evaluate the shape of our assistance programs based on the composition
of the new government and the policies it advocates.”47 American analysts
like Robert Satloff, director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy
(WINEP) – a think tank tied to Bush-era Middle East policy – credit the Biden
visit with swinging the election, by highlighting the economic, military, and
diplomatic risks of voting the wrong way.48 As with the US backing of PA
security forces in the West Bank, the US is funnelling support to one party
in an internally divided political system at the expense of the other. It is,
of course, unsurprising that financial and military assistance designed to tip
the local balance in favour of one side would be imperilled in the event of
an unfavourable election result. At the heart of US democracy promotion –
whether under the Bush administration or its successor – remains the basic
tension between the call for democratic process and the demand for reliable
electoral outcomes that return American allies to power.
As the foregoing pages have shown, regional actors who heeded the
American call for democratisation have found that democracy takes second
seat to American short-term objectives if the two are in apparent con-
flict. When opponents of American influence in the region gain electoral
favour, democracy promotion slides effortlessly into democracy demotion.
Equally disconcerting, the language of American moralism is sufficiently flex-
ible to justify any outcome so long as it is consistent with stabilising the
US’s perceived interests. Such language is fundamentally disconnected from
the tangible experience of local political communities. As a consequence,
coercive threat-making in Lebanon can stand side by side with powerful
denunciations of electoral interference. In this way, resurgent Wilsonianism
224 Aslı Bâli and Aziz Rana
uncritically strips events of their local significance, distorting those mean-
ings and replacing them with a singular focus on US projects. Crucially,
these developments are independent of the sincerity of the American desire
to advance democracy. So long as democratisation remains bound to the
pursuit of pacification and the advancement of stated regional interests, the
basic dynamic will persist. In the end, however, this tension between the
democratic rhetoric and the anti-democratic impact has proven unsustain-
able, especially as frustrated local reformers have seized the language of
democracy to criticise perceived US double standards.49 As the next sec-
tion details, the US’s response has been to undertake a wider reevaluation
of American priorities in the region. Under the rubric of supporting ‘mod-
eration,’ policy makers have shifted the emphasis from democratisation to
producing regime outcomes that are explicitly compatible with American
judgments of interest.
MODERATION AS THE ANTIDOTE TO AMERICAN MORALISM?
In its approach to electoral results in countries like Palestine and Lebanon,
the US is deeply invested in the victories of allies against their domestic
challengers. The advantages of these elites are understood not merely in the
pragmatic terms of patron-client relations, but also as more likely to ensure
regional stability premised on American hegemony and its continued global
footprint. For the US to manage Israeli-Palestinian conflict, stabilise Iraq and
Afghanistan, redefine Syrian-Lebanese relations, and maintain the balance of
power in the Gulf, policy makers have concluded that the central priority
should be supporting compliant local elites. These elites are depicted as
‘moderates’ prepared to defend a pro-American status quo against revisionist
‘extremists’ bent on disorder and the reduction of American influence. The
possibility that free elections might threaten supportive regimes prompted
the US under the Bush administration to downgrade democracy promotion
in favour of constructing an ‘axis of moderation,’ one seen as better able to
secure a pax Americana.
To date, this emphasis on moderation has been equally embraced by
the Obama administration. The legacy of strategic failure in Iraq, Palestine,
and beyond has led both policy makers and US commentators to turn away
from the earlier Bush administration focus on regime change as a catalyst for
an Arab democratic spring.50 While such commentators by and large accept
the good intentions of democracy promotion, they share American officials’
concern that simply defending elections actually produces more (not less)
instability and violence.51 On first glance, this concern with moderation may
appear to be a rejection of millennial aspirations. Yet, as the following dis-
cussion illustrates, the language of moderation has become an increasingly
popular discursive framework for once again conceiving of strategic interests
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in terms of a moral commitment to permanent peace. Such language persists
in viewing the region as marked by chaos and extremism, and as requiring
American intervention in order to produce the putatively more modest goal
of creating ‘moderate’ states.
The American approach to Egypt offers a clear example of the shift
from bolstering the democratic credentials of allies to highlighting instead
their role as moderating influences. For instance, in 2005, US pressure led
the Mubarak regime to jump-start what the regime presented as efforts at
political ‘liberalisation.’ That year Egypt held a deeply flawed procedural
exercise in electoral authoritarianism, which yielded the predictable return to
power of the ruling National Democratic Party. Two years later, the country
adopted constitutional amendments, which the government declared to be
extensions of local democracy, enhancing legislative powers and increasing
electoral competition. Both the elections and the constitutional changes were
heralded by the State Department as part of “a general trend towards political
reform” in Egypt.52 Yet, the Mubarak regimes’ constitutional amendments
and electoral practices were elsewhere described as “the greatest erosion of
human rights in Egypt” in over a quarter century.53
In particular, the cumulative effect of the amendments was to consoli-
date authoritarianism by restraining legitimate political opposition activities
and creating new constitutional tools to entrench the emergency powers
of the state. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace succinctly
assessed the net effect: “The amendments and the process by which they
were passed constitute an effort by the Egyptian regime to increase the
appearance of greater balance among the branches of government and of
greater opportunities for political parties, while in fact limiting real compe-
tition strictly and keeping power concentrated in the hands of the executive
branch and the ruling party.”54 Given the willingness of the American gov-
ernment to embrace the Mubarak regime’s gambit as an example of positive
political reform, numerous analysts accused the United States of being com-
plicit in democracy demotion.55 From the perspective of local aspirations for
real democratisation, the result in fact had been more damaging than sim-
ilar policies absent the moral claims from Mubarak and the United States.
By enabling the Mubarak regime to pursue decidedly anti-democratic ends
under the veneer of liberalisation, the US had helped to undermine the
very discourse of reform that local Egyptian democrats had earlier sought to
embrace.
Rather than limiting American support for Mubarak, the US ultimately
responded to these developments by altering the justification for contin-
ued support. While Mubarak may not be a democrat, his regime represents
a force of ‘moderation’ and stands against the tide of violent extremism.
Mubarak’s centrality to the US’s ‘axis of moderation’ was highlighted by the
very choice of Cairo as the site for Obama’s June 2009 foreign policy speech
to the region. This choice was made despite the fact that numerous Egyptian
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human rights groups saw the decision as further entrenching local authoritar-
ianism. In response, groups such as Kefaya, Egypt’s leading pro-democracy
grassroots organisation, protested by boycotting the speech entirely.56 When
interviewed about Egypt’s internal practices, including the detention of thou-
sands of political prisoners, Obama responded by reasserting the moderating
role played by the government, stating that Mubarak “has been a stalwart
ally in many respects, to the United States. He has sustained peace with
Israel . . . . So I think he has been a force for stability. And good in the
region.”57
This general shift away from democracy-talk to defending the moderat-
ing influence of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other allies began during the latter
stages of the Bush administration. Starting in 2006 and accelerating in 2007,
the Bush administration’s foreign policy in the Middle East moved from its
‘forward strategy of freedom’58 to a focus on commitments more in line
with the political preferences of the pro-American regimes of the region. At
heart, this strategy was primarily concerned with redrawing the political map
of the region around an alliance scheme designed to contain Iran, America’s
principal regional adversary. In justifying this strategic realignment, the US,
much as Obama did in his June 2009 interview, underscored the stabilising
influence of its allies who, while autocratic, remained forces of peace and
regional restraint. Essential to these goals was shoring up the shaky domestic
legitimacy of governments seen as complicit in US regional policy. American
officials hoped that an explicit alliance scheme would enable regional
members to see their interests as aligned and to thereby mutually reinforce,
rather than undermine, their regimes’ stability.
As part of this new alliance strategy, the Bush administration convened
a meeting at Annapolis, ostensibly to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
but in reality to concretise its new grand strategy. Annapolis reconceived
the Palestinian question not as one of either national self-determination or of
conflict-resolution but rather as a microcosm for the regional divide between
the forces of moderation and extremism. For our purposes, what makes the
Annapolis meeting particularly noteworthy is that – as Obama’s Cairo visit
and comments drive home – it remains the basis for justifying the US’s
Middle East alliance system and thus defining who counts as a friend or
an enemy. The next few pages place Annapolis in the broader context of
American moral discourse, which although repackaged around ‘moderation’
continues to be driven by presumptions of special purpose and with it spatial
omnipresence.
At first glance, imagining American allies like Saudi Arabia and Egypt as
forces of moderation seems counter-intuitive; they are hardly defenders of
the rule of law or liberal toleration. Their inclusion begs the obvious ques-
tion: what constitutes moderation? Bush and Obama administration actions
make clear that the ‘axis of moderation’ includes the countries of the Gulf
Cooperation Council, plus Jordan, Egypt, and those elements in Palestine
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and Lebanon that the United States chooses to recognise. At a greater level
of abstraction, the ‘moderate’ Arab countries or regimes appear to have
in common the following three characteristics: (i) they are supportive of
American objectives in the Middle East; (ii) they are willing to normalise
relations with Israel either unilaterally (Jordan, Egypt) or in the context of
a regional peace agreement; and (iii) they wish to curb Iranian influence in
the region. What they do not exhibit is a set of substantive commitments to
liberal legality or moderation in their domestic political order, independent
of American foreign policy priorities.
Sharing little in common other than their desire for regime survival
and a generally pro-American and anti-Iranian orientation, the members
of the ‘axis of moderation’ do not frequently behave like participants in a
well-ordered alliance system. With the American experiment in Iraq widely
decried in the region and the plight of the Palestinians a daily reminder
to Arab publics of the price of American favour, the alignment of these
regimes with the US exacerbates their domestic legitimacy deficits. To retain
their compliance with American grand strategy, the US finds itself having
to orchestrate diplomatic efforts to bolster the credibility of its partners and
their commitment to the American project.
The November 2007 Annapolis convention was the defining example
of an American effort to solidify its preferred axis by providing moderate
political leaders with an opportunity to improve the image of their foreign
policy at home. Much of the coverage of the convention suggested that its
goals were less to do with Israel-Palestine than with alliance building and
American preferences in Iraq and Iran.59 For instance, the Economist offered
an analysis of Annapolis as bolstering a “coalition of the fearful” designed
to create a united Sunni front against mostly Shi’ite “extremists” aligned with
Iran.60 As the article went on to observe, the Arab regimes participating in
this coalition had more to fear from opposition at home than from con-
frontation with Iran, but hoped that the American fixation on Iran would
ensure continued external support for their rule. On this telling, reinitiating
a ‘peace process’ was designed in part to distract from the authoritarianism
of these regimes by giving them the appearance of standing for something
– on behalf of Palestinians – and against something else – the specter of an
extremist ‘shi’a crescent.’ If this analysis is correct, Annapolis advanced goals
that were either unrelated to Israel-Palestine or, even worse, divisive in ways
that undermined prospects for peace. Furthermore and paradoxically, these
goals suggested an aggressive and confrontational meaning to moderation.
Whether or not concern for Israeli-Palestinian peace was actually
paramount, President Bush cast the ‘peace process’ as part of a broader
struggle against extremism. Such an instrumental conception of peace as
a mechanism to advance other American goals in the region reprises the
themes of this article. The values being promoted in the guise of the new
moral imperatives of stability and moderation prove to be either conjoined to
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or derivative of American interests, much as were prior attempts at democ-
racy promotion. Bush’s remarks at the opening of Annapolis were especially
telling:
Our purpose here in Annapolis is not to conclude an agreement. Rather,
it is to launch negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians. . . .
the time is right because a battle is underway for the future of the Middle
East – and we must not cede victory to the extremists. With their vio-
lent actions and contempt for human life, the extremists are seeking
to impose a dark vision. . . . If this vision prevails, the future of the
region will be endless terror, endless war, and endless suffering. Standing
against this dark vision are President Abbas and his government. They
are offering the Palestinian people an alternative vision of the future –
a vision of peace, a homeland of their own, and a better life. If respon-
sible Palestinian leaders can deliver on this vision, they will deal the
forces of extremism a devastating blow. And when liberty takes root in
the rocky soil of the West Bank and Gaza, it will inspire millions across
the Middle East who want their societies built on freedom and peace and
hope.61
Once more, Bush draws together all of the elements of millennialism,
appropriating moral language to serve the strategic promotion of American
interests. Those leaders are “responsible” who share objectives with the
United States, and so are presumed to be forces of moderation, democracy,
and peace. In advancing a polarising vision of the Middle East, in which
opponents are depicted as irreconcilably opposed to the values of lib-
erty and restraint, the convention doubled as an opportunity to deal a
“devastating blow” to America’s adversaries.
As reflected in these comments, the peace being promoted at Annapolis
was without question a pax Americana. This vision excluded the single
option that might have held some prospect for setting the conditions for
an authentic peace process. Such an option would have entailed a cease-
fire between all Palestinian factions and Israel that ended attacks by both
sides (denying Israel the ‘right’ to conduct land and air raids into Gaza or to
engage in assassinations), opened Gaza’s borders to normal commerce, and
generated the political space for negotiations.62 Such terms were precluded
in advance from consideration because they would necessarily require the
inclusion of Hamas, which was at odds with the realignment of the region.
Thus, peace may never have been more elusive than at Annapolis.
So long as the appearance of a peace process is privileged over the fun-
damentals of making such a process genuine, there is little reason to expect
more from future American-led efforts. In fact, to the extent that the Obama
administration persists in maintaining the same divide between moderates
and extremists, new efforts are likely to face the similar local scepticism
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and opposition. As Robert Malley and Hussein Agha write, Obama cannot
achieve success by
strengthening those leaders viewed by their own people as at best weak,
incompetent and feckless, at worst irresponsible, careless and reckless.
It won’t be done by perpetuating the bogus and unhelpful distinction
between extremists and moderates, by isolating the former, reaching out
to the latter, and ending up disconnected from the region’s most relevant
actors. It won’t be done by trying to perform better what was performed
before.63
While Obama no doubt enjoys greater personal popularity than Bush, this
does not mean that local groups will be any more willing to jettison their
own interests and commitments. Regardless of spokesperson, intertwin-
ing the real goal of resolving regional conflict with the empty rhetoric of
moderation imperils nascent efforts at actual coexistence on the ground.
Unfortunately, the Obama administration’s principal foreign policy ini-
tiative in its first year – the ‘new’ Afghanistan-Pakistan policy – suggests
continuity not only with the language of millennialism but also with that
of the extremists-moderates binary. President Obama’s campaign promises
to reprioritise the Afghanistan conflict, while beginning a troop drawdown
in Iraq, were hailed as representing a new and more strategically viable
American approach to the ‘war on terror.’ Within weeks of assuming office,
Obama remarked in an interview that the ‘surge’ model in Iraq might be
transferable to Afghanistan. Specifically, he noted the success of drawing
moderate elements of the Sunni leadership in Iraq into alliance with the
US and suggested that there might be ‘comparable opportunities’ to identify
moderates in Afghanistan and Pakistan.64
In practice, this has meant once again viewing the strengthening of
moderates as a key means for pursuing the transformative agenda of remak-
ing the region from one of perpetual violence into one of peace and security.
Such an approach entails entrenching alliances with leaders like the presi-
dents of Pakistan and Afghanistan. In this context, support is not pegged to
domestic legitimacy or liberalising credentials, but instead to their continued
usefulness in the service of American goals. At the same time, it has meant
using massive economic and defence transfers to expand the internal secu-
rity and military machinery in both countries.65 The financial and military
costs for the US and its local partners are extensive and have been projected
as an indefinite annual commitment many fold greater than Afghanistan’s
yearly revenue.66 As analysts are beginning to note, the probable result of
these policies may well be the creation of a militarised and authoritarian
state in Afghanistan, one that is permanently dependent on foreign aid.67
Yet, the only responses envisioned by either the Bush or Obama administra-
tion remain wedded to the discourses of moderation and pacification, and
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require imposing preferred regional allies through force – at whatever the
cost. As Rory Stewart has observed:
The fundamental assumptions remain that an ungoverned or hostile
Afghanistan is a threat to global security; that the West has the abil-
ity to address the threat and bring prosperity and security; that this is
justified and a moral obligation; that economic development and order
in Afghanistan will contribute to global security; that these different
objectives reinforce each other; and that there is no real alternative.68
This vision of the transformative power of external intervention in the
region and its ability to secure pacification in perpetuity comes at a high
cost indeed, not only financially but in terms of the long-term interests of
the local population. Rather than addressing the underlying ethnic and tribal
competition that has given rise to instability and violence in Afghanistan, or
the cross-border grievances that have destabilised the region for over half
a century, the American strategy would identify, arm, and finance the pre-
ferred local forces of moderation. In all likelihood, the result will be the
imposition of specific elites, whose power to maintain authority ultimately
resides in the willingness of the US to sustain them through indefinite exter-
nal pressure. In the process, the region’s political disputes will be frozen
and alternatives imprisoned within a paradigm derived from and responsive
to American, rather than indigenous, priorities.
CONCLUSION: A PLEA FOR SELF-DETERMINATION AND
AMERICAN RESTRAINT
This article has canvassed the various guises of today’s prevailing
Wilsonianism, moving from the language of democracy promotion to mod-
eration. Despite the emphasis by American policy makers on these moral
aims, virtually no Middle Eastern country is appreciably freer than it was
prior to the advent of the Bush administration.69 The gap between words
and deeds is not, however, peculiar to the Bush presidency, as continuities
across administration and political party make evident. Rather, this gap arises
from the contradiction between espousing claims of democracy on the one
hand and connecting them to American national security interests on the
other – security interests which require a permanent global footprint.
Two potential correctives follow from this account. First, one might
argue for simply abandoning the substantive moral claims often attached
by the US to policies designed to advance national interests. After all, there
is little that is surprising about the observation that the United States is
more interested in stabilising a status quo conducive to its objectives than in
reshaping the Middle East around a set of abstract ideals. If policy makers
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were to pursue American interests in the region by referencing the mutual
gains to be had, in pragmatic and straightforwardly realist terms, and without
resort to claims of the moral superiority of its actions or its projects, it would
likely occasion less vehement popular resentment.
American actions that espouse democracy promotion while extending
support to autocratic allies, in the process undermining reformers and pro-
tracting factional conflicts, have had a doubly corrosive effect. Such actions
tar the language of democratisation with the brush of hypocrisy and chan-
nel opposition to extra-political, and at times violent, means. This can be
corrected to some extent by conceding that the US is no longer in the democ-
racy promotion business. Leaving the question of domestic political reform
to local actors, America could concentrate on its current policy priorities in
the region, namely, reliable access to resources and extending its spatial
footprint through the secure stationing of military assets. This would redirect
popular resentments born of local political conditions toward the autocrats
responsible for those conditions and away from an external patron. Just as
China does not face regional resentment for its investments, so the US might
pursue its regional priorities without provoking the ire of political opposition
groups striving for reform.
Still, while such pragmatism may reduce corrosive blowback effects, it
nonetheless would not address the serious legitimacy crises plaguing local
allies and thus ultimately would be ineffective. In the event that these allies
face internal instability, the US would inevitably be confronted with the
question of whether to prop up weak but friendly regimes. In this context,
the repudiation of Wilsonian language in favour of a pragmatic orientation
would not shield the US from local resentment and resistance so long as it
conceives its strategic interests as requiring a pro-American order premised
on the entrenchment of current allies. This is because shoring up these
regimes may well embroil the US in direct or indirect forms of coercion
should they experience internal pressure. Relying on the support of local
proxies that do not, themselves, enjoy popular support may well remain an
unstable strategy even stripped of self-defeating moral claims.
In the final analysis, any American policy that rejects continuous inter-
vention to protect compliant allies would require a profound rethinking
of its orientation to the Middle East as well as its foundational commit-
ment to geographical omnipresence. The current American global footprint
perpetuates the view of a world in crisis, in which the US must inter-
vene decisively wherever its interests are imperilled. In essence, it justifies
coercive actions that undermine the very possibility of local and authen-
tic democratic developments. Reconceiving both the US’s orientation to the
region and its global footprint would entail developing a geopolitical vision
that refrains from dictating outcomes, but allows autonomous developments
within states to determine the nature of their respective regimes. It means
rejecting the idea of the US as an international police power, responsible for
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securing democratic tranquility and organised globally through a network of
ever-expanding military outposts.
Thus, the second – and more trenchant – corrective that emerges from
this analysis is that the US may best protect its interests in the region by
repudiating a politics of intervention and omnipresence whether articulated
in terms of Wilsonianism or amoral realpolitik. Half a century of American
policy in the region demonstrates that the domestic legitimacy of unpopu-
lar regimes cannot be secured externally, least of all by efforts to redescribe
local autocrats as regional democrats. Supporting these regimes is costly and,
in the long term, intrinsically unstable precisely because of their precarious-
ness. Whereas regional partners that are not internally weak would free US
assets for more efficient use, at present resources are repeatedly diverted to
serve the needs of ailing partners. Furthermore, in viewing all local crises
as threatening forms of disorder, the US has employed massive economic
and military assets to freeze disputes in ways that prevent lasting resolutions
on the ground. In fact, the exercise of American power has had the pri-
mary tendency of orchestrating temporary victories. These victories merely
prolong conflicts, because they are only sustainable if the US maintains a
coercive thumb on local scales. Rather than creating conditions for the end
of US interference and the retrenchment of American resources, interven-
tion in local affairs has primarily worked to create the need for yet more
indefinite intervention. If anything, an American regional interest in peace-
ful coexistence has actually been compromised by its very commitment to
international police power and global expansiveness, geopolitical strategies
that have produced an overstretched military and have promoted neither
democracy nor stability.
Abandoning the American goal of permanent peace – a goal that, in the
Middle East, has taken the form of stabilising a pro-American order – may
also be required for a broader regional settlement. This settlement would
enable local parties to address and resolve underlying conflicts obscured
by external intervention. The emergence of an internally stable and locally
legitimate order in the Middle East would likely do a far better job of securing
America’s long-term interests in reliable access to resources and markets.
But such a fundamental revision of US strategy would have to maintain a
commitment to local self-determination and conflict-resolution even where
the dynamics of domestic legitimacy and regional mediation might seem at
odds with short-term American goals.
This may well mean reducing economic and military aid to regional
allies, which serves primarily to sustain an internal balance of power incon-
sistent with local preferences. For example, limiting support for Mubarak and
allowing for procedurally fair political contestation in Egypt might eventu-
ally end the NDP’s one-party rule. At the very least, it would likely force
the NDP to renegotiate its relationship with Egyptians by building a broader
social base and making real and meaningful concessions. Either way, this
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process might bring revisionist parties to the political table, occasioning
a reassessment of the nature of Egyptian-American relations. But a rene-
gotiated partnership with a new government that enjoys greater domestic
legitimacy may be less costly and more secure in the long-term than betting
on the indefinite ability of the Mubarak clan to leverage foreign assistance
into a monopoly on power.
The primary legacy of recent American actions has been deep scep-
ticism throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds towards US intentions. To
the extent that American political identity and thus geopolitical discourse
and practice remain bound to both millennialism and territorial overreach,
efforts at democracy promotion will persist as a doomed enterprise. They
will either yield sham elections that accord with American objectives at the
expense of democracy or bring to power anti-American forces at the expense
of those objectives. In other words, the conjunction of moral mission and
realpolitik is not a sustainable formula for the advancement of values or
interests. Thus, a successful US foreign policy in the Middle East would
likely need to be considerably more restrained. Such a foreign policy might
advance democracy, but only insofar as democracy is understood in terms of
actual self-determination rather than as an outcome produced by American
interference or conducive to short-term interests.
Unfortunately, the likelihood of a geopolitical shift remains slim, for
reasons that go beyond lobbying groups, bureaucratic incoherence, and the
legacy of both September 11 and neo-conservatism. Both political parties
continue to take as given the centrality of pacification and global omnipres-
ence for the promotion of American interests, despite the extent to which
the experience of the last decade underscores the counter-productivity of
these policies. A repudiation of the prevailing discourse and practice would
entail a fundamental domestic reappraisal of the US’s place in the world.
At present and for the foreseeable future, there is little internal popular and
elite willingness for such a reappraisal. Yet, perhaps simply by appreciating
the pathologies embedded in our current framework, we can begin to think
seriously about the conditions necessary for change.
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